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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIE E. PE:TERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WE8TERN CASUALTY AND 
SURE TY COMP ANY, 




STATEl\IEN'J1 OF THE XA'fFHE OF THE CASJ.<~ 
Responcl<'nt, plain ti ff :n th<' low<'l' eourt. hrm~g!it ai~ 
action again~t tlw dPf Pn(lant, np1i<'llant ltt>rPin, a~ tlu· 
insnrer of 01w CJrnek Nhim L('i\·, to n•co·;pr th(' hP1wfit~ 
nf L<'i\·'s antornohilc' irnmrauct' poli('y and han· tlH' 
polie_i· Jll'<)('('<'<l:-; 1;aid oYt' · ~o n·~:: mclPili to\':anl..- sati~-
2 
DISPOSIT£0N OF' THE LOWJ~R COURT 
Respondent and apptdla11t Paeh fil<>d motions for 
summary judgru<>nt, \rhieh motions were heard at thP 
pretrial. Ilespondent ,,·as graniP<l a st1111111ary ;judg:nHmt. 
against appellant for the sum of $10,000.00 on her first 
cause of action, and n•spondl'Ht's Sl'r'.on<l cause of action 
was dismissed. 
RELIEF SOFGHrP ON APPEAL 
Respondent s<~eks to have the court affirm the 
judgment of the. pretrial court against appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The instant appeal from the lower court arises out 
of a judgment rendered on behalf of respondent against 
one Chuck Shim Lew, Civil No. 1±328(), as filed in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County (Supplemental 
transcript). That case was based upon an au to mo bile 
accident occurring while respondent was a guest pas-
senger in a northbound vehicle on Ninth East when her 
vehicle collided with the insured's vehicle traveling 
west on :27th South in Salt Lake City, Utah in the mor-
ning hours of Febrnary 24, 1963. A dispute existed be-
tween respondent's driver and Lew as to which vehicle 
was favored with the "right of way" because of the 
traffic semaphore. 
Respondent's host driver, DP1mis l\frl\[illan, sub-
mitted to a deposition at th<> request of appellant's 
eonnsel on Augnst 9, 19G3, the deposition being re· 
... 
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r1•ived in PvidP1we h~- ti1(• lowPr court in this case as 
1'~xhibit D-11. In tlint deposition, .l\IcMillan testified the 
ligl1t was green wltPn the vc•hiele he was driving entered 
the intersedion, anJ while in the intersection he ob-
~ervt~d the green light change to amber from the re-
fl(dion of the light on th!' hood of his vehicle (D-11, 
page 16). A contra1·r statement of pmported fact found 
at page 3 of appl~llant's brief is not borne out by the 
record in this case. H concerns the nature of the pro-
l:e<'dings in which Le\: snv1)0sedly testified he had the 
c>;n•(m light and respondent's driver had the red light 
at the time of each vehicle entering the intersection, 
as on page 22 of Exhibit D-11, the deposition indicates 
appellant's insured "in another trial proceeding" testi-
fied McMillan \\·ent through a red light without refer-
ence to the civil or criminal aspects involved. It is con-
ceded that no other eye witnesses are known except 
respondent who also testified in her deposition that the 
light was green at the time the vehicle in which she 
was a passenger entt>red the intersection (Exhibit D-10, 
page 16). 
A civil action was commanded on May 23, 1963, in 
which respondent was the plaintiff and appellant's in-
sured was the defendant. Personal service was had over 
Lew on May 24, 1963, and the usual insurance company 
answt>r was filed Jun0 11, 1963, together with a notice 
of taking of respondent's deposition received as Ecx-
hi hit D-10, after whith the host driver's deposition was 
1aken (Exhibit D-11). 
4 
In the' intc·ri1u ''i';:dlnu(:-; , ,;;:,l'-'Pl '" r:Jt,, it::-; in:-;nn·d 
1 Exhibit _!)_;3) aci':ii :1,'"' ]1 in of' th(·i,· '~l'lh'arnnce into 
the case, w~1iclt ldt(•r 11·a:-; 1 ul :J,.LC'd. This l<'ttPr wa~ 
Wl'ittt:>n to the i11:;u1ul at,,:_:., .]1·ffc-1 '-'1l!l ;.;t1·(·et, Sal'c LaL~ 
City, ltali, n1:c'. IW~ to th<' <L:.~r '"'" c.J' t;;c· i1LSnn'd 011 the 
polic,\· (Exltiliit D-:) -,,lt:cli 1,a:-; 3:21 First Avl'mle, Salt 
Lake City, L·tah. ~\1-<·ording tu apv·ib::i:'s 1·ounsPl 1111 
n~ceiving back ExJ1ibit D-J, he ~' mght tlw senice of an 
independent insurance adjus~er, \1-lto obtained an ad-
dress uf L(·\\ in California. 011 ~eptember G, 19G3, Ex-
hibit D-J a lettl'l' 1\·n:-: 11 rittc'n, add1·,·c-sL'd to S3J Jefferson 
Street, Salt Lakt:> City, l"tah, ·with a carbon copy to 301 
Boyle .A.venue, Los Angeles, Californja. 11 his letter wa~ 
essentially the same as the BxhiLit D-3, 11·ith the c1xcep-
tion of an additional :statemc'nt which reads, "VVe are 
sending the original of this letter to 838 .Jefferson Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and a raruon copy of the letter 
to 301 Boyle Avenue, in Los Angeles, i11 the hope that 
either the original or the copy \\·ill reach you." (Empha-
sis ours) 
Apparently m res1ionse to the carbon copy of the 
letter, a hand printed reply was received by appellant's 
counsel bearing the signature of a Chuck Shim Lew and 
advising: appellant's conn:sel of a ne\\- address, to wit, 
Chung King Hestaurant, 3317 Market Street, Hivt>rside, 
California, and a telephone number of OY-G-7:29:2; which 
lettt:>r specifically stated: "l 1Yish to know if I have to 
appear in court with ~-nu and tlte (bte to ap1war in 
court." In respon:se to thi:-;, appellant',.., eoun:sel wrote 
l~xhibit D-G to the 1\lal'kd Sh'c>t<t ndJress merelr rn-
5 
1nn11i11g Ll'\\. thnt lil' \rnnl<l lw advised when it \Yould 
!H' necp;;:,;ary for hirn to appPar in court . 
• \ noti('(' of n•adinl·;;:-< fo1· trial was filed September 
:..:~, I %3. 
In mid Oetolwr 1%:), ~lr. Herbert C. Papenfuss, 
Lew\; agent at ·w, .,;~Pm, went to California and while 
th<'l'l' attempted to c·Pntact Lew, only to find that he had 
ll·ft California and hau probably gone to Yancouver. 
J\ otwithstanding aehtal knO\dedge to appellant of 
Ln,·'s nnlrnown \\·lw1·eabonts, the record is void of any 
attPmpt to contact Le\\' or wrify his whereabouts until 
after the pretrial which was held February 4, 1964, 
11·hich resulted in the writing of Exhibit D-7 directed to 
Lew in care of Chung King Restaurant, 3817 Market 
Street, Rivenside, California, (which letter was return-
L'd), with a carbon copy to Lew, at 838 Jefferson Street, 
Salt Lake City, 1-tah, (which letter was not returned.) 
Prior to this l\lr. Papenfuss had received a remit-
tance from L<'w giving a return address of a certain 
restaurant in BiPnfait, Saskatchewan, Canada, (Exhibit 
D-2, page 4). 
rl'he reconl next indicates a telephone attempt to 
locate Lrw at thP Club 13, in Saskatchewan, and it was 
discoven'd that he was no longer there, but was prob-
a1)ly in l\Iiami or in Miami Beach, Florida, (Exhibit D-2, 
page 4). Even with this knowledge, Exhibit D-8, on March 
(i, HHi-1-, wa;; \nitfrn to Lew at the •Chung King Restaur-
ant adrlress in California; a carbon copy to Lew at the 
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Club 13, addn:'~S in Sa:-;1:atclu•\\ an, Canada, aml a car-
bon copy to LP\\- at tl;j'.) .Jf'i'ferson Stn·d, Salt Lake City, 
l~tah, advising LP\\- of tlw ,\larcl1 1 :.!th trial date, all of 
which \Yen• returned .... ;ubseql«·ntl;.- on ~I arch 10, E)G-±, 
a formal notlcL' 0f \\. i tlu lnl\rn l o [' c:uunsel and notice to 
appoint counsd was i:rnlll'cl to Lt•\1· at the same addresses, 
but once agai11 tliv Salt Lake letter was not returned. 
(T-44) 
The rnattl"'l" eame 011 for cld'ault trial on Mareh 1:.!. 
and the trial was continued to l\Jarch 25, 1964, out of 
which a judgment was re11de1·ed on belrnlf of respondent 
against Lew for the sum of $12,500.00, from which judg-
ment the action against appellant aris~·s. 
At the time of pretrial in the instant appeal, judg-
ment was rendered on behalf of respondent on her first 
cause of action for the sum o.f $10,000.00, being the policy 
limits. Judgment was rendered for appdlant on the see-
ond cause of action being a claim against vV es tern Cas-
ualty and Surety Company for bargaining in bad faith, 
which daim was for the sum of $2500.00, the excess 
amount of the judgment. This portion of Judge Hanson's 
ruling is not on appeal. A judgment for interest on the 
entire $12,500.00 ·was also granted to 1·espondent. 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENT 
AFTER VIEWING THE FACTS i\IOST FAVORABLE 
TO APPELLANT. 
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The· p1·inC'ipal <;ll<·stion Ill this appeal is very closely 
i (·latecl to a q\H•stion \\ lii<'lt has <·ouie bdore this court 
h\·icP pr<·Yiousl~-: 
0/Jerluuislcy l'. Trurclns f11;mnutce Co., 5 Ftah 2d 
l \ :29.) J>:!d 10!>::3, and Jlo 11 t !JU me ry 1·. Pre I erred Risk 1vlut-
,,1il f ;1s1mwcc ( 'o., ______ l~tah :2J .. ____ , -±11 P:2d -1:88. In the 
!attn l'HSP, this ('Olld :-:d forth the following test, when 
it stated: 
.. Jn ordt-r foe· an insurance company to invoke 
11011-cooveration dause in its contract and avoid 
' itteeting its obligation on that ground, it must 
show that it nsed reasonable diligence in obtain-
ing thP cooperation, that the insured failed, and 
that put it (the company) to some disadvantage." 
Therefore. thi· main issue in this brief is Judge Hanson's 
<'ondusion covering the lack of \Vestern'13 reasonable dili-
w·uce in se!-'king the cooperation of its insured, Chuck 
~him Lew, sinn· al'cording to the l\fontgomery case, the 
otl1L'l' two as1wds of the test do not even come into play 
until tlw cornpan~- has used reasonable diligence. 
It is interesting to note that each of the two fore-
going Ptah decisions have relied upon the California 
C'.Use of Je11s"il 1·. Eureka Casualty Company, et al., 1935, 
j:2 P 2d 5-U, thl• facts of whid1 involved an insured who 
1rns a traveling salPsman. Process had been served upon 
him, which he Jeliwrecl to the insurance adjuster, and 
notified tlw adjuster where he eould be reached in the 
('\(•nt ol' trial. ThP irnrnrauce rPpresentative attempted 
lo lo(·ate its insured at trial time and was unable to do so. 
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On ap]Jt'al in tlH• di red nd ion agni11~t thv c·ornpany, 
the California eourt eonelu\h'd that ~lw in::;nred had not 
sufficiently be<'l1 ad\'ised as to his obligation and the 
need for further C'.oc,1w:c·ation at a foil<' when he could 
have been more m·ailalJle for nn:, n•quested assistance. 
Analogous and in aceor<lane(' with re::;pomknt':s position 
is State Fann illutuul IJ1surnnce Compwiy v. Furmers 
1 nsurance Exclrnill!Jl', On·gon J %::l, i38/ P2d 825. Upon 
being ~med, the in:snred was ~;lm\' in tnrning over suit 
papers to his company. Ldtc:i·s were mailed frolll the 
company to the insnrecl reqne:sting coo1wration and also 
acknmvledgments of the letters. No aeknowledgments 
were ever for.varded. The insured ·was requested to at-
tend trial and an off er to pay expenses was of record 
but no acknowledgement ever came from the insured. 
The Oregon court in concluding that due diligence had 
not been exercised stated on page S30: 
"It (the company) should not have been surprised 
when he did not UlJlH:ar at the trial in response to 
the January letter requesting him to appear." 
Further on page 830, the court observed the i>ersonal 
advantage that an insurance company could obtain for 
itself if permitted to exercise less than reasonable dili-
genece m obtaining the assistance of its insured and 
stated: 
"When the insnred's eoo1wration was not to th<• 
jnsurer's benefit, it n•lie<l upon lt>ttt>rsj not to 
personal contact. It should not .be as~rn1.ned that 
in every case, personal contact 1s <~ssential to an 
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l'Xerci::;e of clue diligvn<'e. However, in this case, 
under all t:iL·eum::;t<J1i;;e::; the absence of an attempt 
to have a repn·::;entativ<~ of the insurer personally 
attempt ~o ::se<.:m\• the i11::sured's presence at trial, 
L::; cla1uagmg tll the defendant's defense." 
On a rehearing of the aLove ca::;e, the Oregon court 
ia 393 P2d 708, 190-l:, at page 709, stated in discussing its 
previous holding: 
"vVe held foat the insurer does not prove the ex-
e1·ci::;e of due uili gence simply by showing that one 
or more lettei-s were directed to the insured re-
questing his attenclanre at trial. We believe that 
the insured received the written request (as we 
must in this case because of the presumption 
created by OR~ 41.360 ( 24). His failure to appear 
may still not constitute a breach of the coopera-
tion clause of the policy under some circum-
stances. Thus it may be that after the insured 
received the request, he died or was incapacitated 
or could not attend without undue hardship. The 
cases generally support the view that the cooper-
ation clam;t> is not breached if the insured's failure 
to attend is not willful. In some cases, perhaps the 
majority, require the insurer to show prejudice to 
its position. We do not decide whether these latter 
cases are ::;ound. In the present case, there is no 
evidence explaining why the insured did not ap-
pear. For the rea::;ons expressed in our original 
opinion, ,,.e believe that the insurer should have 
the burden of showing the insured's failure to 
appear was in fact due to his noncooperation." 
(The Oregon statute cited is merely a codification 
of tlw Connol' Law rule presuming mailed and un-
returned letters are received). 
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Another analogous case' to the instant a1ipeal is 
Penha.ms v. Associated hirle11rnity Corporation (Cal. 
1935) 47 P2d 791, wherein tlw insured moved to Los 
Angeh~s from San Franci:,,;co. Several letters were rnail(->d 
to him with no aeknmdedgHwnt, except in mw instance, 
where the insured wrote haek, ''Please advise as to the 
outcome of the trial r'. 'l'hen it appeared as if the in-
sured had vanished. About three months before trial, the 
company hired private investigators to attempt to locate 
him, which efforts \Vere to no avail. 
The court in sustaining the judgment against in-
surance company noted that the company previously to 
its being unable to locate their insured had, or should 
have had, adequate time to gain his cooperation in pre-
paring their defense if they had so desired. 
On page 79±, the California court ;.;tated: 
"It made no request whatever upon him during 
that time except to keep it informed of his where-
abouts. 
"It is clear therefore that King (the insured) com-
mitted no breach of the policy up to December 
12, 1930, the time he left Los Angeles without 
notifying appellant as to his future whereabouts, 
and the issue narrows dovvn to the single question 
of whether under the circumstances above stated 
his failure to attend the trial constituted a breach 
of a material provision of the policy, the effect 
of which was prejudicial to appellant." 
In the instant appeal, ]£xhihit D-5 i:,,; the appellant's 
hand printed letter from Lew inquiring of appellant's 
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<·ounsi>l if it 'votdd lw nPe<•s:-;ary for him to appear at 
trial, to whid1 inquir>· ll1e n·ply letter (Exhibit D-6) 
merdy states: 
''\\'e will adYi:sc· you'' ht>11 it is nccps:mry for vou 
to appear in court or of any other action which )·on 
might he required to take in connection with this 
case. 
\\·ith no s1wcifil'. rc•pl~· to Le\\·'s n•qtwst until "B-.ebruary, 
1%-!, (Exhibit D-7). 
Other cases diseussing the question 0f reasonableness 
of efforts to obtain the assistance of their insured are 
Johnson v. Doughty (Oregon 1963) 385 P2d 760, in which 
the court states at pages 70:2 and 763: 
''The t-vidence proved that the insurer did not 
mah· a rcasona ble effort to locate Doughty. The 
only lettt•r sent to Doughty was directed to an 
address known to be incorrect at a time when the 
insurer had reason to know of a better address. 
The evicknee creates a strong inference that the 
insurer did not want to locate Doughty under the 
circumstances of the case. Under such circum-
stances the mere fact that Doughty disappeared 
is insuffieient to show lack of cooperation." (Re-
lying 011 P<'11nsyli;anici Thresherman and Farmers 
Mitfiwl Ccisualty I 11.surance Company v. Owens, 
238 Fed. :2d 5-1:9 Fourth Circuit 1956) (Emphasis 
ours). 
Another is Pennsylvania Thresherman and Far-
mer's Mutual Cas1talty Compwny v. Owens (Fourth Cir-
cuit) (South Carolina193G), :238 Fed 2d 549, where the 
Federal court at page 550 stated: 
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"'l'he vrohlem of noncooperation has a dual 
aspect: 
Not only what tlw ass med failed to do but what 
t~e insurer on its vart did to secure the coopera-
tio~ from an apathetic inattentive or vanishing 
policy holder must he considered. Liability insur-
ance is intended not only to indemnify the ·as~mred 
but also to vrotect the members of the public who 
may be injured through negligence. Indeed such 
insurance is made mandatory in many states. lt 
would greatly weaken the practical usefulnPss of 
policies designed to afford pub lie protection, if 
it \Yere enough to show mere disappearance of 
the assured without full proof of proper efforts 
by the insurer to locate him." (Citing Tudor v 
Commonwealth Casualty Company 163 At. 27, 10 
NJ Misc. 1206) 
Further on page 551, the court stated: 
"vV e might add that the circumstances afford no 
hint to explain vV ood's disappearance. There is no 
suggestion of domestic discord; any effort to 
escape criminal prosecution or other reason to 
abscond. From all that the record shows, he may 
have been the victim of foul play or disability 
operate was willful. There was no evidence of any 
inquiries other than from the wife and the pastor. 
No inquiries were made from the police or Wood's 
place_of employment, where his employer or fellow 
workers might possibly have given a clue to his 
whereabouts or at the post office to learn if he had 
left a forwarding address. Requiring such addi-
tional efforts would not seem to impose an un-
in which it could not be said that failure to co-
reasonable burden." 
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~ix qf thl' t•igltt C<lli('S discussed at length in alJpellant's 
IJl'iPr· ean bl' J.iiferentiateu 1rom the fact situation on 
nppeal arnl from the ca..,eE; hereinbefore cited in this 
hrief: 
A. Pu1clik v. StatP Funn ill'llhllll Automobile Insur-
1111ce Co., :3()2 F'L·d. :2d :255 (CA 7th 19G:2) was concerned 
1rith cliseussion of a fact situation where the insured 
wi/lj'11lly failed to ap1war after receiving nctual notice 
uf trial date; 
B. Rohlf 1:. Great American Mutual Indemnity, 
Hil NI~ 232, 27 Ohio A pp. 208 ( 1927) involved collusion 
IJ:,· the insured and the injured; 
C. Cooper i;. Employer's MittualLiability Insurmice 
Company of Wisconsi-11, 103 SE :2d 210, 199 Va 908 (1958) 
and Grady v. State Farm Midiial Auto Insurance Com-
prmy, :2().-t Fed :2d 519 (GA 4th 1959) are decided under 
a unir1ue Virginia rule of law where failure to attend the 
trial in and of itself is lack of cooperation sufficient to 
absolve a company from liability. 
D. Potomac Insurance Company v. Stanley, 281 Fed 
2d 775 (CA 7th 19GO) and Indemnity Insurance Company 
of North Am,c'1·iui v. Sniith, 78 A. 2d 461, Md (1951) are 
deeided under a different rule of law than is in force in 
Lltah, to wit, complete cooperation of the insured is a 
conditio11 precedPut to an insured's being entitled to the 
l1en(•fit:-; or an insurance policy. 
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In comparing th<> foregoing east's "·ith the instant 
appeal, it wonld ap1war to th<> writer that appellant 
should have been placed on notice of the itint>rant char-
acter of its insmPJ a:-; \\ lil'n the sul1ject 1iiatter insurance 
policy ~was writte"'.1 on .Jamm1 ~· :2-t, 19G3, Le\Y's address 
was 321 First A n'nuc•, ~alt Lak(~ City, Utah (Bxhibit 
D-1). The first correspcndence after the accident involv-
ing appellant (dakd .July :25, 1963) was directed to 828 
Jefferson Street, Salt Lake City, Utah (Exhibit D-3) 
which letter was retumed. 'rhen after being located by 
an independent insurance adjuster from a re(1nest by 
appellant's counsel, original correspondence was directed 
to Lew at 838 Jefferson, Salt Lake City, Utah, with car-
bon copy of the same to 301 Boyle Street, Los Angeles, 
Califomia (Exhibit D-4). A hand-printed reply appar-
ently from Lew under date of September 19, 1963, was 
directed to appellant's counsel giving an address of the 
Chung King Restaurant, 3817 Market Street, Riverside, 
California, together with a phone number of "OV6-2792", 
(Exhibit D-5), which merely resulted in a short letter 
from counsel to Lew, dated September 23, 1963, (Exhibit 
D-6). 
In mid-October, 1964, actual notice of Lew's having left 
the Market Street address and probably California was 
given l\Ir. Herbert C. Papenfuss, one of appellant's 
agents, when l\fr. Papenfuss went to California and while : 
there attempted to locate Lew, only to find that he had 
gone to Canada, iirohahly to Yancouw~·. The record is 
completely void of any attempts to locate him in Canada 
at that time. 
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l 11 th(' first part of .Jnnnar)', 19G-±, a n·mittance was 
t'c>tt'i Vl'd b)· l'apP111\1st; from Lew giving a return address 
u[ "Club 1:3, Bi<'Hfait, >:-la~;lrnteh<''-'·an, Canada", (D-2, page 
+, 11-+5). 'L'ltP n~eonl is fol'ther void of any attempt to 
\(•rif~- this or to make contad with Lew at that address 
nntil afh·r thl' im'trial lwlu Febrnary -±, 1964. 
LettPr:s date('. l1'ebrnarv 7 19GJ notifvin()" Lew of the 
.I ' ' .r b 
trial date vvere obviously useless as they were sent to 
Riverside, California, and 838 .Jefferson, Salt Lake City, 
l' tali, ( D-7). \Vhen thP l)~lifornia letter was returned, 
thn.'atPning lettf'rs elated March 6, 1964 were mailed to 
Ll'\\' once again at 8:38 Jeff el'Son, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
c,~ Chung King Hestaurant; Riverside, California; and 
finally to the Club 13, Hienfait, Saskatchewan, Canada 
(D-8) all of which were returned. 
It would sPelll only reasonable from the use of three 
Salt Lake address0s, two 'California addresses and pos-
sibly two Canadian addresses within a twelve month per-
iod that Wes tern Casualty should have been on notice 
of the tram;ient character of its insured. It s failure to 
obtain the insmed's de1>osition under these circum-
stances; and, its failure in keeping the insured advised 
of the expected time lapse before pretrial and the ex-
pected time laps<~ from pretrial until the trial, hardly 
seems to bL' exercising reasonable diligence in maintain-
ing contact with a nomadic Chinese restaurant worker. 
These facts indicate a :similar ;,;ituation to Jensen v. 
F,'1trcka, supra. 
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In addition to all of these facts tlh' n~cord is abso-
lntely void of any attempted eontac:t with L<~w hy any 
private investigator, by any insurance adjuster, by any 
credit company, or thrnugh Gt•neral l\Jotors Acceptance 
Corporation, the lm;s vay<~e on L(~w\; in:mrance policy. 
Therefore, under the rules of Oberhanslcy v. Trav-
elers supra, and M untgomery 'L'. Pref erred Risk Insur-
ance Compa~iy, supra, and the tests contained in those 
cases, the principal question before this court is whether 
or not in viewing the facts most favorable to the appel-
lant, did it use reasonable diligence in attempting to 
obtain the cooperation of its insured, 'vith full knowledge 
of his wandering traits. rrhe burden of obtaining Lew's 
assistance was left to appellant's counsel which Judge 
Hanson concluded was not a reasonable effort by the 
company to obtain cooperation; which conclusion should 
be sustained. 
POINT II ON APPEAL 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACT 
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS "AGENTS IN VAR-
IOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY WHO WERE ABLE 
TO AT LEAST DETERMINE THE ADDRESS OF 
THE INSURED." 
Judge Hanson's memorandum decision made the 
statement in the above headnote and this conclusion was 
reached by him 1yi tltout any evidPnce lwing adduced in 
the proffer of proof proceeding:::;. In 31 CJS, Evidence, 
Section 36, is found the following: 
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"C'oml:,; may tni;(• jud;cial rngnizance of public 
01· official 1u:ut<l.o u~ 2,llleral imblic intere:;t in-
duding 1mbl>· 1·c·c·ords in the 1'\•deral and State 
(~\.1•cutivtl c1vpnr'111ents, and including public re-
cords in th1: 1\·cLial arnl State AdministrativP 
lJOdi<>s, sueh ns the ol'fice of the State Treasurer 
01· th<c Secretary of State and r<c•cords of other 
public officers, (•0111111itkes and admini:;trative 
bodies at 1<·20~ to the extent that such records are 
re<1uired by hrn .. , 
Jn llcc!lrtn v. Pri!e, 193 P:2d GG:2., (ldaho 19±8) the 
Sn!H'tcLW Court of ldaJ10 :;tated at page 668: 
"We take judicial notice of the public and pri-
Yate acts of the legislature and the journals of 
the legi::-;lative bodies. . " 
A case iu point with the instant appeal is that of 
Gully v. Lwn/!l'rnwn's Mid11al Casualty Company, (Mis-
:;is-;ivpi 193()) Ui8 ~o. G09, where in the Supreme Court 
of 1\lissi::;si ppi, on page GlO stated in discussing whether a 
certain insurance rnmpany was authorized by its charter 
to do a certain type of business: 
"'l'hose facts are shown hy the records of the 
office of the insuranee commissioner. The office 
of the imml'ance eommissioner is a coordinate 
branch of tlw f-ltate government. The courts will 
take judicial noti('e of its records and the con-
tents thereof." 
'11herefore, .T udge Ham,;on could properly take judi-
<: i al notice of the reeonls of the F tah Insurance Cormnis-
::.; iom'i'. lt i::.; inte1·esting to notP in its 1965 annual report, 
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appellant :-tatPd it \\-a" doing h11.'-i111"'"'" in tliirt:- "ewn 
:- tates and the District nf (' ::1 um hi a and the 196-± annual 
report shm,-s thirty :'ix stat1·,; and the· Di,-trict nf l'olmn-
bia. Both annual l 1,porb ;-;]ir,,,_- \\" e:-:tnn wa" doing hu::;i-
ness in California nn(l Flrlri·lr,, aJHl tlwrpfore, taking 
judicial notice of th1""1' in.l·liC' ref·orrl:-s i" a rt>asonahle lmsis 
for arriving at the (·011du:-"ion of the presence of agents 
in various parts of the eountry. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID :'\OT ERR I.'.\" ITS ASSESS~IE!\T 
OF INTEREST AGAIXST THE DEFEi\DAXT AND 
APPELLAINT. 
Plaintiff in the lower court prayed for judgment on 
each cause of action togetlwr with interest on each cause 
of action. At the pretrial proeeedings a specific motion 
for interest on the entire amount of the judgment was 
made (T-4:8). 
\Vithout professing to he an expert mathematician, 
the proper amount of interest on $12,500.00 at eight per-
cent per annum can be calculated, which sum seems to 
be $1771.00. 
The priJ?.cipal question for this court to decide is 
whether or not an insurance company is liable for in-
terest at the judgment rate on the entire amount of a 
judgment until it pays the policy limits towards satisfy-
ing the judgment. In this appeal. .Ju<lg1· Hanson oln-iously 
intended to grant an award of interest at the rate of 
eight percent per annum on $12.500.0ll, 1Yhich respondent 
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r·cmkn<l:- i:- the i1rnpc·1· ml<· of law for this court to sus-
tain. 
Tn the Ca8!' or Ri1:en:ulley Cartage Company 1'. 
!fr11rkc.11c-,)'1·c11rity Jn;-;11uu1ce Co11tpany, 1959, 17 Ill 2d 
~-t~, 1()1 N"E :2d lGl, 7G ALR :2d 978, judgment was ren-
ckred again::;t the insmed for the smn of $175,000.00. 
The lllinois court in this case overruled its previous 
decision of H1afsPku i·. Bituminous Ca0uulty Corporation, 
1952, 3-1:7 Ill Avp l.+9, 106 NE 2d 204, in construing what 
apJH~llant has conceded to be the "standard interest 
(·lamw·· liy noting at 11ag·p 990 of the annotation, and the 
writer noted: 
""rhe court noted to what it called the 'realities 
of the relationship between the insurer and the 
insured' namely, that under the terms of the pol-
icy, the insurer has complete control of any liti-
gation from which it might incur liability; that 
the insured cannot settle with the injured per-
son without relieving the insurer from its obliga-
tion; that any delay which may cause the accumu-
lation of interest is therefore the responsibility of 
th(~ insmer and that for this reason until the in-
surer has discharged its obligations under the 
policy, it should bPar the entire expense of such 
delay. As a recognition by the insurers themselves 
of the Yalidity of the last argument, the court 
referred to a recent change in the standard in-
terest clause approved by the National Bureau of 
Casualty Underwriters, which made absolutely 
clear the liability of the insurer for interest on 
the entire judgment. 
ThP principal that interest is recoverable on 
the full amount of the judgment is also supported 
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by some text ·writers. (See, i.e., Risjord Under-
writing Intent, 7 Fe.dPratiun of Insurance Counsel 
Quarterly 41, as quoted in United Service Auto-
mobile Association v. R11sson 1957, Court of Ap-
peals Fifth, Texas) 2-1:1 Fed 2d 296: 'When the 
policy ref erred to all interest, the underwriters 
meant all interest on the judgment ·whatever its 
size in relation to the policy limits .... The Sep-
tember 1, 1956, Standard Family Automobile Pol- i 
icy makes this point clear by stating the company 
is liable for all interest on the entire amount of 
any judgment." 
Also, in support of respondent's position are the numer-
ous other cases found in 76 ALR 2d 987. 
Appellant in its brief on page 34 cites to this court 
the Ohio case of Carlile v. Vari, 113 Ohio 233, 177 NE 2d 
()94 (1961), as stating the Ohio rule; however, this over-
looks the case of Coventry v. Steve Koren, Inc., 1 Ohio 
App 2d 385, 205 NE 2d 18, which appf'ars to this writer 
to overrule the earlier Carlile case. 
The court's attention is directed to the provisions 
of Wes tern's policy which states : 
" ... costs taxed against the insnred in any such 
suit and all interest on the entire amount of any 
jndginent therein which accrues after entry of the 
judgment and before \Ve stern has paid or. ten-
dered or deposited in court that p&rt of the JUdg-
i 1wn1 whif'h does not E'XCf'ed tJw limit of w·estern's 
liability thereon." 
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gnag<' of the above <.:lan:-;e in any other manner than to 
eonclude that \\' e:-;tem is obligated for interest on the 
P11tire amou11t of any judgment until it pays, tenders, or 
cleposii.:,; the funds in the manner prescribed. 
'l'here are numerous decisions that vary from the 
rule which resvondent seeks this court to uphold; how-
l'Ver, generally tlwse involved cases where the courts 
have been called upon lo interpret other policy provisions 
other than what we now eall the "standard interest 
dause." 
A review of the cases in the Annotated Case Ser-
vice of ALR indieates that a majority ·)f the courts be-
fore whom this specific question has come, are now 
abiding by the rule stated above in Rivervalley Cartage 
Company v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company, 
supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent requests this court to sustain the judg-
ment of the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson in concluding 
that as a matter of law in viewing the facts most favor-
able to Western Casualty and Surety Company, as the 
insurer of Chuck Shim Lew, \Vestern did not exercise 
reasonable diligence in obtaining the cooperation of its 
insured; thereafter, directing its attorneys to withdraw 




In addition respondent requests this court to sustain 
the judgment awarding interest at the rate of eight per-
cent per annum on the entire amount of the judgment 
until Western complies with the provisions of the "stan-
dard interest clause" of it .; policy. Respondent further 
requests this court to award her costs of this proceeding. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH & McRAE 
516 Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for respondent 
